An Enhanced Initial Margin Methodology to Manage Warehoused Credit Risk by Cipolina-Kun, Lucia et al.
An Enhanced Initial Margin Methodology to Manage
Warehoused Credit Risk
Lucia Cipolina-Kun1, Ignacio Ruiz2, and Mariano Zeron-Medina Laris3
1Morgan Stanley
2MoCaX Intelligence by iRuiz Technologies. i.ruiz@iruiztechnologies.com
3MoCaX Intelligence by iRuiz Technologies. m.zeron@iruiztechnologies.com
December 27, 2018
Abstract
The use of CVA to cover credit risk is widely spread, but has its limitations. Namely,
dealers face the problem of the illiquidity of instruments used for hedging it, hence forced
to warehouse credit risk. As a result, dealers tend to offer a limited OTC derivatives
market to highly risky counterparties. Consequently, those highly risky entities rarely
have access to hedging services precisely when they need them most.
In this paper we propose a method to overcome this limitation. We propose to extend
the CVA risk-neutral framework to compute an initial margin (IM) specific to each coun-
terparty, which depends on the credit quality of the entity at stake, transforming the
effective credit rating of a given netting set to AAA, regardless of the credit rating of the
counterparty.
The proposed methodology is fully compliant with the risk-neutral pricing framework,
enables improved risk management for dealers and, subsequently, a route for troubled
institutions to access the derivative markets.
By transforming CVA requirement into IM ones, as proposed in this paper, an institution
could rely on the existing mechanisms for posting and calling of IM, hence ensuring the
operational viability of this new form of managing warehoused risk. The main difference
with the currently standard framework is the creation of a Specific Initial Margin, that
depends in the credit rating of the counterparty and the characteristics of the netting set
in question. In this paper we propose a methodology for such transformation in a sound
manner, and hence this method overcomes some of the limitations of the CVA framework.
Using a range of Swaps and Swaptions, we present realistic numerical examples of CVA
values under margining, IM values as computed nowadays, as well as the new amounts of
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Specific Initial Margin computed under the framework introduced in this paper. In our
opinion, transition to this enhance frameworks could be smooth, and in the interest of all
parties, including broker-dealers and derivative users.
1 Introduction
In response to the 2007 − 08 crisis, Regulators proposed a series of measures with the aim
of decreasing the interbank counterparty credit risk that, in a domino-like effect, brought the
interbank market to a halt during the credit crunch. The new rules are motivated by the
clearing and margining mechanisms long adopted by Central Clearing houses which have been
perceived to be effective in curtailing the contagion effects of defaulting counterparties.
Two key regulations have been passed. First, regulators want derivatives dealers to clear as
many trades as possible through clearing houses. These houses require clearing members to
post a set of collateral amounts composed of at least variation margin (VM), initial margin
(IM) and a default fund contribution. Second, as proposed by the Basel Committee of Banking
Supervision in [1], uncleared trades between the vast majority of financial institutions and large
corporates must be subject to variation and initial margining, both posted daily.
Financial institutions have been posting variation margin for bilateral trades in the past, how-
ever posting bilateral IM is new to the industry. The rationale under the new bilateral IM
requirement is to use IM as a buffer against the gap risk of netting sets previously covered by
VM only1. If a netting set is only collateralized with VM, in a default event, the surviving
party still faces the risk arising from the market movements until the defaulted trades are either
wound down or re-hedged. Under the new IM requirement for bilateral trades, the IM amount
is posted into a segregated account, therefore, the surviving entity can take the IM posted
by the defaulted counterparty to compensate for the losses it may incur during the close-out
period.
The basis of the modelling of bilateral IM and its settling rules were jointly proposed in 2015
by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organisation
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) [1]. There are two regulatory schemes used to compute
bilateral IM of a netting set. The first is a simple Schedule-based approach that calculates
a trade-level IM amount based on a percentage of its notional basis. Under this scheme, no
IM netting is allowed, therefore this method is generally avoided by financial institutions as
it tends to be very costly2. The second is an advanced Model-based approach. Under this
scheme, IM is determined as the 99-percentile loss of the netting set over the margin period of
risk (MPoR), computed under stressed market conditions.
Given that IM under the Model-based approach is substantially lower than its Schedule-based
equivalent as soon as netting effects are moderate, most institutions are implementing Model-
based margining for their books of uncleared trades.
The interbank association ISDA has put forward the risk-based Standard Initial Margin Model
(SIMM) [7] with the aim of standardising the model-based IM that each institution calculates
1By gap risk we mean the adverse change in the netting set value after the counterpartys default. It is also
called close-out risk.
2Exceptions may include institutions with highly directional netting sets such as pension funds.
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and hence minimise the chances of IM disputes. ISDAs SIMM model has become very relevant
as it has been adopted widely across the industry and approved by regulators across many
jurisdictions3.
This is the form of IM we assume for the rest of the paper. It must be noted, however, that
the Specific Initial Margin we propose can be defined for IM computed under any scheme.
1.1 The Framework
Margining as described above significantly reduces counterparty credit risk but does not cover
it in its entirety. As mentioned before, bilateral IM models should cover 99% of netting set
losses during the MPoR. The fraction of the risk left uncovered can be measured via the
Credit Value Adjustment (CVA). CVA is the risk-neutral price of the counterparty credit risk
embedded in a netting set. In theory, this price equals the cost of hedging the default risk of
the netting set in question. However, after the introduction of mandatory VM and IM, the high
amount of collateralization results in CVA amounts that are virtually negligible compared to
the monetary size of the transaction. Works by Andersen et al. [4] and Gregory [10] estimate
that the introduction of IM will reduce the expected exposure by approximately two orders of
magnitude. Our numerical results support this estimate as can be seen in table 1 below.
As a result of this reduction in the expected exposure, the CVA in a collateralized transaction
is often deemed too small to be exchanged. Even if it is exchanged, this risk cannot always
be hedged in practice. For example, the Credit Default Swap market used for hedging often
does not have the needed depth. This restricts the trading options of a dealer as it is not
compensated for the small but still present counterparty credit risk, according to the credit
rating of the counterparty.
To exemplify the point, say we are a derivatives dealer with two clients, both subject to VM
and IM under the CSA terms. Let us say that, today, there is only one significant difference
between the clients: Counterparty 1 is an entity with a strong credit standing (say AAA),
while Counterparty 2 is poorly rated (say CCC). If the dealer perceives the credit risk coming
from each counterparty to be roughly equal because CVA is so small that it is not charged, she
will be virtually equally inclined to trade with either counterparty. This is financially unsound
as Counterparty 1 is a better entity than Counterparty 2. It is also suboptimal from the
risk management standpoint because the added riskiness of Counterparty 2 is not taken into
account, leading to risk-skewed balance sheets. If, on the contrary, CVA is charged, however
large or small it may be, the market will typically not offer Credit Default Swaps for it, hence
its credit risk cannot be hedged, and the derivative dealer has no other option than warehousing
the risk.
Warehousing credit risk from poorly rated counterparties is not something desired by dealers
for obvious reasons. Hence, dealers do not tend to offer them derivative transactions. Often
this happens when these hedging services are most needed.
3The mandatory implementation of SIMM takes place between 2016 and 2020, and aims to incorporate
all relevant financial institutions and corporates. The largest financial institutions began exchanging bilateral
initial and variation margin from September 1 (2016), under rules that took effect in the US, Japan and Canada.
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We put forward the following question: is there a way for a derivatives dealer to transform a
CCC risk into a AAA risk, despite the credit hedging limitations of the market?
The answer to the question above is yes. In this paper we propose a methodology to achieve
this by defining what we call Specific Initial Margin, obtained by requesting an additional
IM amount on top of the current IM as given by the SIMM model, that depends on the
credit quality of the counterparty. This means that each counterparty will post an IM amount
according to its credit rating4.
The proposed calculation process involves reducing the CVA of any given counterparty down
to that of the strongest counterparty (e.g. AAA) by increasing the IM demanded to the
counterparty in question. By doing this, the Counterparty Credit Risk is reduced to that
of a strong entity (e.g. AAA) even when there is no market to hedge it out, because the
dealer has an extra buffer protection in the form of IM posted in a segregated account. In
this way, we are transforming the credit risk of a poorly rated counterparty into funding cost
for the counterparty. Of course, if the counterparty is poorly rated, its funding cost will be
high, but how to deal with that problem is beyond the scope of this paper. In this paper we
propose a practical way for a dealer to offer derivative products to a counterparty, that has no
credit-hedging market, without having to warehouse the risk.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes IM within the context of the risk
neutral pricing framework and how our proposal fits within this context. Section 3 presents
the details of how we compute the Specific Initial Margin of each counterparty. Section 5
presents computed values of Specific Initial Margin for a range of counterparties and a range
of Swaps and Swaptions (of varying maturities). In Section 6 we end with a brief conclusion.
2 IM in the Context of Risk Neutral Pricing
CVA is the risk-neutral price of the counterparty credit risk embedded in a netting set. Follow-
ing the replication approach [8], this price must be equal to the cost of hedging the default risk
of the netting set at stake. Risk-neutral pricing theory assumes that all risks can be hedged.
When done properly we end up with a risk-free netting set. In this way, a broker dealer selling
a derivative should make the risk-free rate of return, plus the margin it charges its clients for
the services provided 5.
Given the high level of margin required (i.e. at a 99% level), collateralizing the exposure with
VM and IM yields a quasi-default-risk-free netting set. As a result, CVA is very small compared
to the monetary size of the transaction. The chart below shows the disparity between CVA
values and the Notionals of the corresponding trades, before and after collateralization. Given
the small values of Collateralised CVA, it is often not exchanged.
4Note that under the current ISDA rules, an entity is allowed to request an IM higher than SIMM to a
counterparty. Therefore, there are no legal constraints that apply to our method.
5By services it is meant the provision of OTC derivatives for the needed hedging purposes of the client.
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Table 1: CVA for different collateralization schemes for an at-the-money swap.
Rating Prob default Notional Uncollateralised Collateralised Collateralised
(basis points) CVA CVA (VM) CVA (VM-IM)
AAA 1 $1,000,000 $8,238 $98 $0.02
CCC 2682 $1,000,000 $570,198 $9,152 $0.25
Figures in US dollars
As CVA with VM and IM becomes very small for all counterparties, there is no practical way
for a dealer to measure the difference in counterparty credit risk 6 between counterparties with
different ratings, with the subsequent discussed limitations this leads to. To solve this problem,
we propose adjusting the IM amount requested to each counterparty. hola
As a motivating example, say we have the same situation as the one presented in Section 1: a
dealer facing two counterparties; Counterparty 1 is AAA rated with a CVA for a given netting
set of, say, $1, while Counterparty 2 is CCC rated with a CVA for the same netting set of, say,
$10. The difference in premiums reflects the difference in counterparty credit risk between the
two of them. Assume the CVA is too small to be exchanged and/or that the dealer cannot
hedge the default risk with Counterparty 2. What we propose is for the dealer to ask the
Counterparty 2 (the CCC one) for extra IM so that its counterparty risk is decreased to the
level of Counterparty 1 (the AAA one), making them equivalent from a credit-risk worthiness.
The natural question is: how much IM should the dealer demand from Counterparty 2?
We solve this problem by increasing the IM requirements of Counterparty 2 so that its CVA
is equal to the CVA of Counterparty 1 (remember we assume identical netting sets in this
illustrative example). By doing so, the respective netting sets of both counterparties end up
being risk equivalent and of AAA quality. Under the newly proposed scenario, the dealer is
free to charge both Counterparty 1 and Counterparty 2 a CVA of 1. By posting an extra IM
amount, we have effectively converted the netting set of Counterparty 2 into a AAA-equivalent
one. Counterparty 2 will have to pay an extra funding cost and face liquidity risk on the extra
IM, but that issue is beyond the scope of this piece of work. Details of how to compute the
extra IM needed for a given counterparty and trade in question are presented in Section 3.
The rationale of the method is to reduce the problematic CVA as much as possible: down to the
CVA of the highest rated counterparty, by adjusting the IM according to the credit rating of
the counterparty, thus compensating the dealer for the credit risk inherent in the counterparty.
It must be noted that we are not challenging the risk-neutral pricing theory but complementing
it; compensating for the assumption that all risks can be hedged, when they sometimes cannot.
Within this framework, we implicitly acknowledge that default risk cannot be hedged and devise
an alternative strategy, via margining, to make the netting set quasi-default-risk-free.
6Counterparty credit risk that is small but still present.
5
3 Specific Initial Margin
In this section we define Specific Initial Margin for any given counterparty. As it has already
been mentioned, we do this by reducing the CVA of the counterparty in question to that of a
AAA-quality one by increasing the IM demanded of it. Assuming the lowest CVA corresponds
to the counterparty with the highest credit rating, the minimum IM any counterparty is asked
for is the amount of IM that is currently computed in the industry (e.g. SIMM). We decompose
IM jtotal, the total initial margin demanded of counterparty j, into two components
IM jspecific = IMgeneral + IM
j
add-on (1)
Where IMgeneral accounts for the Gap risk without any consideration of the credit quality of
the counterparty (e.g. SIMM), and IM jadd-on is the add-on that accounts for the portion of
IM jspecific that is specific to the counterparty. For reasons that will become clear, we express
IM jadd-on as a proportion of IMgeneral giving us
IM jspecific = IMgeneral + α
jIMgeneral (2)
where αj is a real value that depends on the default probability of counterparty j.
Take the definition of CVA presented in [6]. For counterparty i this is
CV Ai0 = E
[∫ T
0
(Vt − VMt − IMt)+ LGDitPDitDFtdt
]
(3)
where Vt, VMt and IMt are, respectively, the value of the netting set, the VM posted/received,
and the IM available to the Bank at time t. The term ()+ symbolizes zero-flooring, LGDit the
Loss Given Default of the counterparty in question at time t; PDit the counterparty marginal
default probability at time t; DFt the risky discount factor at time t, and T the time to
maturity of the netting set 7.
Assume Counterparty i to be the counterparty with the best credit rating available in the
market and Counterparty j any other counterparty. Note that in Equation 3, the exposure
part of the equation is the same for both counterparties while the term that distinguishes
counterparties is the marginal default probability. The LGD can be assumed to be the same
for both counterparties given the context of this calculation8. In Equation 3, until now, IMt
corresponds to the value of IMgeneral from Equation 2 at each time point t in the future, which
yields, different CVA values for different counterparties, everything else being the same. To
make them equal, we replace IMt by IMt +α
jIMt from Equation 2, where IMt will typically
be given by the SIMM.
7By marginal default probability at time t we mean the default probability between t and t+ dt, given that
the counterparty has survived up to time t.
8As the use of this framework is to compute the extra IM needed to reduce the counterparty credit risk of a
given entity to that of a AAA, we can assume, without loss of generalization, the LGD to be constant and the
same for different counterparties.
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CV Aj0 = E
[∫ T
0
(
Vt − VMt − IMt − αjIMt
)+
LGDjtPD
j
tDFtdt
]
(4)
The objective is to compute the value αj in Equation 4 corresponding to Counterparty j that
makes the CVA of Counterparty j equal to the CVA of Counterparty i.
We compute αj as follows. First, the CVA for Counterparty i is computed using equation
3 by running a Monte Carlo simulation. Note that this involves simulating the risk factors
that drive the value of the netting set and computing the exposure (i.e. Vt − VMt − IMt), at
each time step t and Monte Carlo path. Second, within the same Monte Carlo simulation, we
numerically solve for αj in the following equation
E
[∫ T
0
(Vt − VMt − IMt)+ LGDtPDitDFtdt
]
− E
[∫ T
0
(
Vt − VMt − IMt − αjIMt
)+
LGDtPD
j
tDFtdt
]
= 0 (5)
Note that we assume the value αj used in the Monte Carlo simulation is constant. That is,
it is independent of the node defined by each path and time point within the Monte Carlo
simulation. Therefore, the add-on Initial Margin (αjIMt) at each node of the simulation is a
constant proportion of the initial margin IMt
9.
Lastly, the value αj that solves Equation 5 is used in Equation 1 to determine IM jadd-on for
Counterparty 2 and compute todays IM jspecific .
As stated in Section 1, under this new framework, the specific initial margin requested (i.e.
IM jspecific), depends on the difference in credit ratings between counterparties i and j. Specif-
ically, from Equation 5, we can see that the lower the rating of a counterparty, the higher
IM jspecific will tend to be. By reducing the CVA to virtually risk-free levels (i.e. those of a
AAA-rated counterparty), the IM now not just covers 99% of possible netting set losses during
the MPoR, but also compensates for the counterparty credit risk that CVA is meant to cover.
Equivalently, one can think of IM jspecific as an IM value that has been calibrated at a higher
percentile, where this percentile depends on the counterpartys credit ratings.
4 Formulaic Approach
In the following formulas we take the difference between Equation 4 (CVA computed with
IMspecific) and Equation 3 (CVA computed with IMgeneral), to capture the portion of credit
risk covered by IMspecific which ordinary IM does not.
9Strictly speaking, in a full-world simulation, the parameter αj should depend on the simulated credit
worthiness of the counterparty at each Monte Carlo node. However, this refinement is expected to lead only to
second-order adjustments in todays value of αj , so we have decided to leave it constant throughout the Monte
Carlo simulation. Further research could shed light onto the validity of this hypothesis.
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Take Xt = Vt−VMt− IMg, where IMg = IMgeneral and θ(X) to be the step function defined
as follows
θ(X) =
{
0 if X ≤ 0
1 if X > 0
Using the above definitions, we express Equation 4 as
CV Aj0 = E
[∫ T
0
(Xt − αjIMg)θ(Xt − αjIMg)LGDjtPDjtDFtdt
]
. (6)
Given that
(Xt − αjIMg)θ(Xt − αjIMg)
= Xtθ(Xt) +Xt[θ(Xt − IM js )− θ(Xt)]− IMJs θ(Xt − IM js ), (7)
Equation 6 can be further split into the following terms
ρ1 = E
[∫ T
0
Xtθ(Xt)LGD
j
tPD
j
tDFtdt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(Vt − VMt − IMg)θ(Vt − VMt − IMg)LGDjtPDjtDFtdt
]
,
(8)
ρ2 = E
[∫ T
0
Xt[θ(Xt − αjIMg)− θ(Xt)]LGDjtPDjtDFtdt
]
, (9)
where
θ(Xt − αjIMg)− θ(Xt)
= (Vt − VMt − IMg)θ(Vt − VMt − IMg − αjIMg)− θ(Vt − VMt − IMg), (10)
ρ3 = −E
[∫ T
0
αjIMgθ(Xt − αjIMg)LGDjtPDjtDFtdt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
αjIMgθ(Vt − VMt − IMg − αjIMg)LGDjtPDjtDFtdt
]
.
(11)
The term ρ1 is Equation 3 which is the CVA obtained with SIMM only. As has been explained
in this paper, if this corresponds to the CVA of a badly rated counterparty, it may be difficult
to hedge. The sum of terms ρ2 and ρ3 represent the portion of this CVA that specific IM helps
us cover. Notice that θ(Xt − αjIMg)− θ(Xt) is zero or negative, hence ρ2 is always negative.
What we are left with is Equation 6 which is the CVA of a AAA rated counterparty, which is
much easier to hedge.
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5 Numerical Tests
In this section we present the simulated α values and IM components (IMspecific and IMadd-on)
that were obtained for a collection of trades and counterparties. As we present these results,
we make some notes and observations on how these quantities vary depending on trade char-
acteristics.
As explained in Section 2 under the proposed framework, a AAA-rated counterparty will always
have to post SIMM, while the rest will have to post SIMM + αjSIMM , where αj depends
on the counterpartys rating and the financial instruments in the netting set. The values of
αj are computed by equating the CVA of the counterparty in question with the CVA of the
AAA-counterparty, as expressed in Equation 5. The portfolios used for illustrative calculations
are single-trade netting sets with at-the-money Interest Rate Swaps and European Swaptions,
both of varying maturities. The European Swaptions were cash settled and always had an
underlying swap of 5 years. Single-trade netting sets help identify how α varies according to
the counterpartys and trades properties. However, it must be noted that in a real-world setting,
this calculation has to be done for netting sets composed of many trades, so the important
inter-trade netting effects are accounted for.
The methodology used to compute Dynamic Initial Margin (DIM) is based on Chebyshev
Spectral Decomposition techniques, as it ensures exact DIM simulation per Monte Carlo path
with very small computational cost [9], ideal for optimisation problems such as this.
The CVA values are computed using a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths. The root
finding algorithm used to compute the value α for each netting set is the Newton-Ralphson
root finding method.
5.1 Dependency on credit rating
Figures 1 and 2 show how the IMspecific increases as the credit rating deteriorates. This
happens in the examples with both Swaps and European Swaptions. This is clearly to be
expected as higher probability of defaults mean higher CVA values. To compensate for higher
CVA disparities, higher IMspecific values are needed for Equation 5 to hold.
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AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC/C
Counterparty rating
0
10000
20000
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50000
60000
IM
IM and extra IM per counterparty
5 years Swap extra IM
5 years Swap IM
Figure 1
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC/C
Counterparty rating
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
IM
IM and extra IM per counterparty
5 years Swaption ATM extra IM
5 years Swaption ATM IM
Figure 2
An observation worth making is that the alpha values obtained were negative in some special
cases (e.g. AA). This is as a result of the numerical noise of the Monte Carlo simulation and
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the noise in the profile of marginal default probabilities due to scarcity of data. As expected,
these negative values are small, hence we floored alpha to zero. This is coherent with the fact
that most solid financial institutions are at least AA rated, hence SIMM is a good value for
IM to be posted between them.
5.2 Dependency on portfolio maturity
As has been discussed above, as the credit rating decreases, the value of IMspecific tends to
increase. However, the rate at which this increase takes place can vary depending on the
characteristics of the netting set. In figures 3 and 4 we see that changing the maturity of
the European Swaption drastically changed the rate at which the IMspecific values increase
across ratings. The IMspecific demanded of the BBB counterparty is roughly twice the amount
demanded of the AAA one; while the IMspecific demanded of the CCC is more than twenty
times higher the one demanded of the AAA counterparty. This contrasts with the Swap, where
the increase of IMspecific demanded across ratings increases much more linearly: the IMspecific
demanded of the BBB counterparty is roughly twice the one demanded of the AAA one, while
the IMspecific demanded of the CCC counterparty is only between 2 and 3 times higher.
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC/C
Counterparty rating
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
IM
IM and extra IM per counterparty
3 years Swap extra IM
3 years Swap IM
5 years Swap extra IM
5 years Swap IM
Figure 3
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AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC/C
Counterparty rating
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
IM
IM and extra IM per counterparty
3 years Swaption ATM extra IM
3 years Swaption ATM IM
5 years Swaption ATM extra IM
5 years Swaption ATM IM
Figure 4
Within the same trade type, even when the increase of α values is of roughly the same order
of magnitude for trades of different maturities, the values themselves will be different. Take
for example the Figure 5 which shows how the α values vary across credit ratings for swaps
of different maturities. In general, as the maturity of the trade increases the α values tend to
decrease for every counterparty.
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Note also, as can be seen from tables 2 and 3, that higher values of alpha do not mean higher
levels of IMspecific. In our example, counterparty CCC has an extra IMspecific demand for a
10-year Swap which is more than twice that of the 3-year Swap; this despite α for the 10-year
Swap being around half of that for the 3-year Swap. This of course is no surprise as todays IM
for both trades are different.
Table 2: IM values per rating.
Maturity IM AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC
3 13,801 0 4,263 8,105 14,425 20,161 24,126 26,445
5 2,6789 0 0 3,859 17,547 30,615 36,924 39,108
7 35,912 0 0 3,906 16,208 27,220 31,971 34,227
10 51,832 0 1,380 18,900 34,143 51,980 54,536 58,363
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Table 3: Alpha values per rating
Maturity AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC
3 0 0.308907 0.58726 1.045221 1.460771 1.748091 1.916069
5 0 0 0.144077 0.655038 1.142833 1.378342 1.459857
7 0 0 0.108764 0.451318 0.757964 0.890267 0.954463
10 0 0.026635 0.364651 0.658728 1.002851 1.05217 1.126013
There is nothing in the examples presented that cannot be generalised to more complex real-
world netting sets. A financial institution should be able to compute, given a netting set, and
a counterparty, the proportion (α value) of SIMM that needs to be added to the IM required
of the counterparty to turn the netting set into a AAA-quality one. As in the CVA world,
in which it is the incremental CVA that is priced into the trade, in this IM world it is the
incremental IM that is requested from the counterparty for the execution of the trade. Just
as with CVA, this should be computed for every incoming trade and adjusted on ever existing
netting set on a daily basis, or as often as IM is computed.
It is important to note that computing the α values corresponding to a given trade (or set of
trades) and different counterparties is computationally very demanding. One must be able to
run a Monte Carlo simulation of market-to-market values (to compute VM) and SIMM (or any
other IM value). In this paper we were able to do such computations in a single and ordinary
PC using Chebyshev Spectral Decomposition methods as proposed in [9].
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced an upgraded methodology for Initial Margin (Specific Initial
Margin) that depends on the credit rating of the counterparty. As opposed to the current CVA
amounts which are negligible, we have shown that the extra IM required is significant specially
for the lowest rated counterparties.
The new Specific Initial Margin is composed of two quantities: the IM as computed today
in the industry (e.g. SIMM) plus an add-on, which depends on the counterparties credit
rating. This second component is computed so that under a CVA framework, the CVA of the
corresponding netting set is reduced to that of a AAA-rated counterparty (as described in 3).
Note that other risk metrics could be used (e.g. peak PFE); however, we think CVA is optimal
given its widespread use in the industry and its sound pricing risk-neutral foundations.
This new type of IM has the following advantages. First, by reducing the CVA of the coun-
terparty via extra IM we adjust the counterparties effective credit rating. This is convenient
given that CVA, in the real world, can fail to provide the protection for which it was designed.
By transferring the CVA value to an IM add-on, we take advantage of the mechanisms in
place within the industry that ensures the posting and use of IM amounts when needed, hence
protecting against CCR more effectively 10. Moreover, in this way, everything is in compliance
10In the case of bilateral IM, Basels directives require it to be posted on a third-party segregated account
14
with the risk-neutral pricing assumptions.
Lastly, given the way IMspecific is defined, the lower the credit rating of a counterparty, the
higher IMspecific will be. This makes total sense from a financial standpoint. In this paper we
proposed a methodology to compute IMspecific, both for total and trade-incremental values, in
an effective and sound manner.
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